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of state convey political ideas. . . . A person gets from a symbol
the meaning he puts into it, and what is one man's comfort and
inspiration is another's jest and scorn. . . . Here it is the state
that employs a flag as a symbol of adherence to government as
presently organized.
28
These exerpts from Justice Jackson's opinion in Barnette underscore
the point that the flag or the preservation of it is not so sacrosanct
an interest as to justify denying a constitutionally protected liberty.
There is no mysticism in the American concept of the State or of
the nature and origin of its authority.... Authority here is to be
controlled by public opinion, not public opinion by authority....
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion.
29
Hence, if one differs with the prevailing authority and tries to
form a following to create an opinion against that authority, he may
speak without fear.30 If one wishes to effectively express rejection
of the entire system, what better way to do it than to reject its
symbol-the flag. As Justice Douglas in his dissent in Adderly v.
Florida1 noted, mere talk, petitions through regular "channels" and
other "usuar' means of voicing dissent are so futile that other tactics
are needed. Justice Black, in his dissent in Beauharnais,32 strongly
urged that political protest, because of its valuable content, never be
wholly excluded. The peaceful burning of a flag certainly voices an
effective political protest.
If the State seeks to elicit patriotism by compulsory adherence to
a symbol and to punish those who refuse, it will find that,
Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find them-
selves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion
achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard. 33
Nestor L. Olesnyckyj
CoNsTrunoNAL LAw-FRST AmENDMENT FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
PREss-FEDERAL COMMUNICATEON COMMISSION's FAurNEss DocrnuE
AND PimsoNAL ATTACK RuLE.-On November 27, 1964, Red Lion
Broadcasting Company [hereinafter Red Lion] carried on its Pennsyl-
28 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632-33 (1943).
29 Id. at 641-42.30 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 264-65 (1952).
31385 U.S. 39, 49-51 (1966).
32 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
33 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943).
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vania radio station, WGCB, a broadcast by Reverend Billy James
Hargis as part of the "Christian Crusade" series. Hargis in discussing
a book by Fred J. Cook, Goldwater-Extremist on the Right, made
what was rather clearly a personal attack on Cook.1 Neither radio
station WGCB nor its parent company, Red Lion, notified Cook of
the attack; nor did they offer him a tape or transcript of the broad-
cast or time to reply to Hargis' accusations.2 Cook learned of the
attack and requested free time to reply, which was refused by Red
Lion, although a copy of the station's rate schedules was sent to him.
Cook then appealed to the Federal Communications Commission [here-
inafter FCC] which ruled that Hargis' broadcast had been a personal
attack on Cook, that Red Lion had failed to meet its obligations
under FCC's Fairness Doctrine, and ordered Red Lion to make free
time available for Cook to reply to Hargis' charges. Red Lion appealed
the FCC's decision to the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia which upheld the FCC's position as constitutional and
otherwise proper. Red Lion then appealed this ruling to the Supreme
Court. Held: Affirmed. The personal attack principle of the FCC's
Fairness Doctrine and the procedures to be followed thereunder are
not violative of the first amendment and in fact enhance rather than
abridge the freedoms of speech and press. Red Lion Broadcasting
Company v. Federal Communications Commission, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
Red Lion is the first case to squarely challenge the constitutionality
of the FCC's personal attack rule and the Fairness Doctrine5 of which
'The Federal Communications Commission [hereinafter cited as FCC] de-
fines a personal attack as an "attack . .. upon the honesty, character, integrity or
like personal qualities of an identified person or group... ' 47 C.F.R. § 73.123
(1969). See note 29 infra.
Included in Harps' broadcast were the following statements:
Now, this paperback book by Fred J. Cook is entitled Goldwater-Ex-
tremist on the Right. Who is Cook? Cook was fired from the New York
World Telegram after he made a false charge publicly on television
against an un-named official of the New York City government. New
York publishers and Newsweek magazine for December 7, 1959, showed
that Fred Cook and his pal, Eugene Gleason, had made up the whole
story and this confession was made to New York District Attorney,
Frank Hogan. After losing his job, Cook went to work for the left-wing
publication, The Nation, one of the most scurrilous publications of the
left which has championed many communist causes over many years.
Its editor, Carry McWilliams, has been affiliated with many communist
enterprises, scores of which have been cited as subversive by the At-
torney General of the U.S. or by other government agencies . . . now
this is the man who wrote the book to smear and destroy Barry Gold-
water.... 395 U.S. at 371-372.
2The FCC regulation on procedures to be followed by licensees under the
personal attack rule is cited at note 29 infra.
3The Fairness Doctrine has been divided into four subheadings: (1) equal
time for political candidates, (2) the personal attack rule, (3) fair presentation
of opposing sides of issues of public importance, and (4) balanced programming
(Continued on next page)
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it is a part. What is currently known as the Fairness Doctrine had
its inception in the Radio Act of 1927,4 requiring broadcasters to
operate in the public interest. This principle, albeit somewhat am-
biguously expressed, was carried through into the Communications
Act of 1934,5 which is, as amended, the currently controlling legisla-
tion in this field providing the statutory authority for the FCC regula-
tions. This authority given the FCC by Congress to assure that
broadcasters operate in the public interest ". . is a broad one, a
power 'not niggardly but expansive." In addition the Court found
a more specific statutory recognition of the Fairness Doctrine in
Congress' 1959 amendment to section 315 of the Communications
Act of 1934:7
This language makes it very plain that Congress, in 1959, an-
nounced that the phrase "public interest;" which had been in the
Act since 1927, imposed a duty on broadcasters to discuss both
sides of controversial public issues. In other words, the amendment
vindicated the FCC's general view that the fairness doctrine in-
hered in the public interest standard.8
While the specific principle of the Fairness Doctrine with which
the Court was here concerned, i.e. the personal attack rule, had not
been specifically enunciated at the time of Congress' action in 1959,
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
policy. Comment, The Red Lion Case: An Opportunity for First Amendment
Reappraisal, 29 U. Prrr. L. REv. 691, 692 (1968).
444 Stat. 1162 (1927), repealed, 48 Stat. 1102 (1934).
The intent of Congress in enacting this legislation, as evidenced a state-
ment by Congressman White, a sponsor of the bill enacted as the Radio Act of
1927, was clearly to maintain radio as a medium of free speech for the general
public. White stated:
We have reached the definite conclusion that the right of all our people
to enjoy this means of communication can be preserved only by the re-
pudiation of the idea . . . that anyone who will may transmit and the
assertion in its stead of the doctrine that the right of the public to
service is superior to the right of any individual. . . .If enacted into
law, the broadcasting privilege will not be a right of selfishness. It will
rest upon an assurance of public interest to be served. 67 CoNG. EcE.
5479 (1926).
5 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1964).
6National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943);
accord, FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 90 (1953); FCC v.
Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, at 138 (1940); FRC v. Nelson Bros.
Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 285 (1933).
7 In amending section 315 of the Act, which accorded equal time to political
candidates, to except certain appearances on news programs, Congress stated
that this amendment made no exception "from the obligaton imposed upon
[broadcasters] under this Act to operate in the public interest and to anfrd
reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public
importance." Act of September 14, 1959, § 1, 73 Stat. 557, amending 47
U.S.C. § 315(a).
8Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1969).
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the basis of the rule had been noted by the FCC in 1949,9 and had
been elaborated upon in several rulings after that date, prior to 1959.10
Although Congress did indicate support for an obligation of broad-
casters to fairly present both sides of controversial public issues,"
whether or not specific approval of the general Fairness Doctrine
rulings and the embryonic personal attack rule was intended is not
really of major significance. It is important, however, that Congress
did affirmatively indicate agreement with the basic objective of the
Fairness Doctrine.12 Regardless of Congressional intent in amending
section 315, the Court made an interesting analogy in comparing
the FCC's personal attack rule to the statutory provisions specifically
enacted by Congress in section 315. In light of the fact that when a
broadcaster grants time to a political candidate, Congress demands
that equal time be afforded his opponents, the Court said, "It would
exceed our competence to hold that the Commission is unauthorized
by the statute to employ a similar device where personal attacks or
political editorials are broadcast by a radio or television station."'
3
The administrative history of the Fairness Doctrine had its begin-
ning shortly after the adoption of the Radio Act of 1927 in a series
of administrative' 4 and judicial rulings interpreting the pricniple of
operation in the public interest.' 5 In interpreting this phrase "public
interest," both the FRC and later the FCC emphasized that: (1) "public
interest" means exactly what it says on its face, i.e. that broadcasters
are to serve the public and not the private interests of any individuals
9 See note 21 infra.
10 See note 28 infra.
11 See note 7 supra.
12 The Court found the language of two of the sponsors of the bill to amend
section 315 of the Act persuasive in support of the Fairness Doctrine:
In explaining the language to the Senate after the committee changes
Senator Pastore said: 'We insisted that the provisions remain in the bill
[i.e. the section of the amendment quoted at note 7, supra], to be a con-
tinuing reminder and admonition to the Federal Communications Com-
mission and to the broadcasters alike, that we were not abandoning the
philosophy that gave birth to section 315, in giving the people the right
to have a full and complete disclosure of conflicting views on news of
interest to the people of the country.' 105 Cong. Rec. 17830. Senator
Scott .. . added that: 'It is intended to encompass all legitimate areas
of public importance which are controversial, not just politics.' 105
Cong. Rec. 17831. 395 U.S. at 384.
13 395 U.S. at 385.
'4 The administrative agency set up by the Radio Act of 1927 was the Federal
Radio Commission [hereinafter cited as FRCI. After the enactment of the
Communications Act of 1934, this agency became the Federal Communications
Commission.
'5 See, e.g., Trinity Methodist Church, South v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir.
1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933); KFKB Broadcasting Co., 10 F.C.C. 515
(1945); Young People's Association for the Propagation of the Gospel, 6 F.C.C.
178 (1938)- Chicago Federation of Labor, 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 36 (1929), aff'd,
Chicago Fed'n of Labor v. FRC, 41 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1930).
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or groups;'. (2) the licensee has assumed an obligation, as a form of
public trustee in regard to broadcast frequencies, to fairly present
competing views on issues of public importance. 17 While a number of
these early cases involved rather flagrant operations in futherance
of purely individual or group interests, they did form the core ideals
around which the Fairness Doctrine has developed.
In the 1941 Mayflower Broadcasting Corporation case,' 8 the Com-
mission's decision was generally interpreted as a ban on any type of
broadcast editorializing. This prompted the Commission in 1949 to
promulgate a document, the Editorializing Report,19 which is the
statement that sets forth most fully basic FCC policy in regard to the
Fairness Doctrine. Forming the foundation of the Fairness Doctrine,
along with the Editoralizing Report is the Fairness Primer2" a 1964
FCC report which more specifically explained FCC policy in this
area through a digest of illustrative rulings.
The Editorializing Report is the basic administrative act in
respect to the Fairness Doctrine. While it deals with the general
policy of the Fairness Doctrine, it implicitly recognized in 1949 what
was later to be codified as the personal attack rule.21 The Editorial-
izing Report placed a two-fold obligation on the broadcast licensee:
(1) that he devote a reasonable proportion of his broadcast time
to the discussion of controversial issues of public importance, and
16 See, e.g., Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32 (1929),
ree'd an other grounds, Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. FRC, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C.
Cir. 1930), cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 706 (1930), noted in 2 P & F RADio REG.
2d 1921 (1964). The FRC added that,
Insofar as a program consists of discussions of public questions, public
interest requires ample play for the free and fair competition of opposing
views, and the Commission believes that the principle applies ...to
all discussions of issues of importance to the public. 2 P & F RAio REc. 2d
1921 (1964).
17 Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333 (1941). The FCC succintly
stated its position on this basis for the Fairness Doctrine:
Freedom of speech on the radio must be broad enough to provide full and
equal opportunity for the presentation to the public of all sides of public
issues. Indeed, as one licensed to operate in the public domain the
licensee has assumed the obligation of presenting all sides of important
public questions fairly, objectively and without bias. The public interest,
not the private, is paramount. Id. at 340.
18 Id.
19 Report of the Commission in the Matter of Editorializing by Broadcast
Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Editoralizing Report].
20 Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial
Issues of Public Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10416 (1964), 2 P & F RADio REc. 2d
1901 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Fairness Primer].
21 ". . . [E]lementary considerations of fairness may dictate that time be
allocated to a person or group which has been specifically attacked over the
station, where otherwise no such obligation would exist." Elitorializing Report,
13 F.C.C. 1246, 1252.
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(2) in doing so he be fair.22 The broadcaster was characterized as a
public trustee and emphasis was placed on his duty to operate with
the public interest foremost.
23
The Editorializing Report, however, went further than merely
requiring the licensee to respond to requests to present opposing
views. It was pointed out that the public interest is best served
when the people are able ". . to hear expositions of the various
positions taken by responsible groups and individuals on particular
topics and to choose between them."24 The Commission was thus
placing the broadcasters in an active rather than a passive role in
fairly presenting controversial issues. The Commission added:
... [I]t is evident that broadcast licensees have an affirmative duty
generally to encourage and implement the broadcast of all sides of
controversial public issues over their facilities, over and beyond
their obligation to make available on demand opportunities for the
expression of opposing views. It is clear that any approximation of
fairness in the presentation of any controversy will be difficult if
not impossible of achievement unless the licensee plays a conscious
and positive role in bringing about balanced presentation of op-
posing viewpoints. 25
The Editorializing Report observed that this obligation placed on
broadcasters did, to some extent, limit their freedom to use their
station solely in the manner they chose, but justified this in that it
was done to ". . make possible the maintenance of radio as a
medium of freedom of speech for the general public."26 The Com-
mission noted that only where a licensee's discretion was so limited
by the obligation to provide a reasonable opportunity for the pre-
sentation of balanced views on issues of sufficient importance to
merit air time could radio be so maintained as a medium of free
speech for all the people.27
The Fairness Primer, issued in 1964, was essentially a bringing
together of the FCC's position on the Fairness Doctrine, including the
personal attack rule, through a restatement of pertinent FCC rulings
subsequent to 1949.28
222P&FADio RE(. 2d 1923 (1964).
23 "... [T]is licensee responsibility is to be exercised in the interests of, and
as a trustee for the public at large which retains ultimate control over the channels
of radio and television communications." Editoralizing Report, 13 F.C.C. 1246,
1247 (1948).
24 Id. at 1251.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 1250.
27 id.
2 BWhile the Fairness Primer dealt with the broad range of FCC policy under
(Continued on next page)
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The principles which were established in the Editorializing Report
and the Fairness Primer in regard to the personal attack rule have
recently been codified into a specific and explicit set of rules for
broadcast licensees to follow. 29
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
the Fairness Doctrine, the section devoted to the personal attack rule noted a
number of decisions in which the rule had been developed. In Billings Broad-
casting Co., 62 F.C.C. 736 (1962) the Commission had stated:
Where . . . a station's editoriafs contain a personal attack upon an indi-
vidual by name, the fairness doctrine requires that a copy of the specific
editorial or editorials shall be communicated to the person attacked either
prior to or at the time of the broadcast of such editorials so that a reason-
able opportunity is afforded that person to reply. This duty on the part
of the station is greater where... interest in the editorials was consciously
built up by a station over a period of days and the time within which the
person attacked would have an opportunity to reply was known to be
limited. 23 P & F RADIO BEG. 951 (1962).
In the case of Douglas A. Anello, 63 F.C.C. 850 (1963), the Commission added
that obligations under the personal attack rule applied to anything broadcast by a
licensee:
The personal attack principle is applied whether a station is personally
involved or not. The licensee is fully responsible for all matter which is
broadcast over his station.... Where a personal attack is made and no
script or tape is available, good sense and fairness dictate that the licensee
send as accurate a summary as possible of the substance of the attack to
the person or group involved. 2 P & F RADiO BEG. 2d 1917 (1963).
See also Cullman Broadcasting Co., 25 P & F RADIO BEG. 895 (1963); Times-
Mirror Broadcasting Co., 24 P & F RADio BEG. 404 (1962); Clayton W. Mapoles,
23 P & F RADio REG. 586 (1962); Metropolitan Broadcasting Corp., 19 P & F
RADIO BEG. 602 (1959); John J. Dempsey, 6 P & F RADio BRE. 615 (1950); The
Evening News Assn, 6 P & F RADiO BEG. 283 (1950); New Broadcasting Co., 6
P & F RADIo REG. 258 (1950.29 The codification is as follows:
Personal attacks; political editorials.
(a) When, during the presentation of views on a controversial issue
of public importance, an attack is made upon the honesty, character,
integrity or like personal qualities of an identified person or group, the
licensee shall, within a reasonable time and in no event later than one
week after the attack, transmit to the person or group attacked (1)
notification of the date, time and identification of the broadcast; (2) a
script or tape (or an accurate summary if a script or tape is not avail-
able) of the attack; and (3) an offer of a reasonable opportunity to re-
spond over the licensee's facilities.
(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this section shall not be
applicable (i) to attacks on foreign groups or foreign public figures; (ii)
to personal attacks which are made by legally quatfied candidates, their
authorized spokesmen, or those associated with them in the campaign, on
other such candidates, their authorized spokesmen, or persons associated
with the candidates in the campaign; and (iii) to bona fide newscasts,
bona fide news interviews, and on-the-spot coverage of a bona fide news
event (including commentary or analysis contained in the foregoing pro-
grams, but the provisions of paragraph (a) shall be applicable to edi-
torials of the licensee).
Note: The fairness doctrine is applicable to situations coming
within (iii), above, and, in a specific factual situation, may be applicable
in the general area of political broadcasts (ii), above. See Section 315
(a) of the Act, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a); Public Notice: Applicability of the
Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Im-
portance. 29 Fed. Reg. 10415. The categories listed in (iii) are the same
(Continued on next page)
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The major question which was before the Court in Red Lion
was the licensee's contention that the first amendment protects "...
their desire to use their allotted frequencies continuously to broad-
cast whatever they choose, and to exclude whomever they choose
from ever using that frequency."30 They argued that no man could
be prohibited from saying what he thought or from refusing in his
statements to give equal weight to opposing views.
31
Although it was observed that the broadcasting medium was not
unaffected by the first amendment,32 the Court noted that differences
in character of media could justify the application of different first
amendment standards,3 3 and added, "The right of free speech of
a broadcaster ...does not embrace a right to snuff out the free
speech of others."34
The Court also found the limited number of broadcast frequencies
to be a persuasive factor in applying somewhat different first amend-
ment standards to broadcasters as compared to the press.35 The
broadcast licensee was characterized by the Court, as by the FCC,
as a trustee for the public rather than as one having an exclusive
monopoly, as the appellant's arguments implicitly asserted.36 The
Court stated that no constitutional right extended to a licensee to
hold a broadcast license or to monopolize a frequency to the exclusion
of the remainder of the public.
37
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
as those specified in Section 315(a) of the Act. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123,
73.300, 73.598, 73.679 (1969) all identical.
In a memorandum opinion written at the time of the codification of the
previously "unwritten" personal attack rules cited above, the FCC commented on
criticism of the regulations:
Statements that the rules will discourage, rather than encourage, con-
troversial programming ignore the fact that the rules do no more than
restate existing substantive policy-a policy designed to encourage con-
troversial programming by insuring that more than one viewpoint on
issues of public importance are carried over licensees' facilities ...
Further we do not perceive any discouragement to controversial issue
programming, except for a licensee who wished to present only one side
of such programming-namely, the personal attack and not the response
by the individual attacked. 8 F.C.C. 2d 721, 725 (1967).
30 395 U.S. at 386.
31 Id.
32 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948), cited
in 395 U.S. at 386.
33Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952), cited in 395
U.S. at 386-87.
34Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945), cited in 395
U.S. at 387.35 "Where there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast
than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First
Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to
speak, write or publish." 395 U.S. at 388.
36 395 U.S. at 389.
37 Id.
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There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Gov-
ernment from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with
others and to ... present those views and voices which are repre-
sentative of his community and which would otherwise, by neces-
sity, be barred from the airwaves.38
In addition the Court was unable to find any merit in appellants
contention that the personal attack rule and the Fairness Doctrine
would have what might be termed a "chilling effect" on their freedom
of expression by forcing a form of self-censorship on broadcasters
because of their fear of being required to make free reply time
available to speakers whose views might be unpalatable to the
licensees.39 While on the surface this may appear to be a reasonable
argument, it would at the same time seem incongruous for broadcast
licensees to invoke first amendment protections in order to allow
themselves to tread along the precipice of libel and distortion without
any obligation to fairly present an opposing view. The bias of this
contention is evident, and its real meaning was seen in an earlier
statement by the FCC: ". . . [W]e do not perceive any discourage-
ment to controversial issue programming [by the codification of the
personal attack rule] except for a licensee who wished to present
only one side of such programming."40
The specific issue before the Court in Red Lion was the con-
stitutionality of the personal attack principle of the Fairness Doctrine.
However, the Court concerned itself with the overall policy of the
Fairness Doctrine. While the Court limited its holdings to the
regulations and the ruling in issue here, it is important that it dealt
with the broader view of the Fairness Doctrine, since there is a great
deal less argument as to the propriety of the personal attack rule
than as to the other standards of the Fairness Doctrine. Basic dis-
agreement lies more with other FCC regulations and rulings under
the Fairness Doctrine than with the personal attack rule, especially
when the policy is extended in its scope as it was in the recent FCC
ruling regarding anti-smoking commercials.41 The equities seem
clearer in a case of personal attack, as in Red Lion, where the
character of a person or group is assailed, than under other Fairness
Doctrine requirements that place an obligation on broadcasters to
affirmatively take steps to present opposing views on issues of public
importance. The Court, while specifically dealing only with the
88 Id.
39 Id. at 392-93.
40 8 F.C.C. 2d 721, 725 (1967); see note 29 supra.
41 WCBS-TV, 9 P & F RADIo REG. 2d 1423, aff'd on reconsideration, 11 P &
F RADIO BEG. 2d 1901 (1967).
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personal attack rule, indicated support of the basic policy of the
Fairness Doctrine. The Court found that policy not only constitution-
ally supportable, but absolutely essential to the maintenance of a
broadcasting medium as an instrument of freedom of expression,
untainted by personal or group biases. Combining this factor with the
scarcity of broadcast frequencies and the necessary government
control of these frequencies, a different interpretation of first amend-
ment rights in regard to broadcasting was justified by the Court, as
related to other media. The Court pointed out, however, that these
varied first amendment standards as to broadcasters do not affect
the basic substantive rights guaranteed by the first amendment. 42
The Court had stated in an early opinion that, ". . . [the first]
amendment rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemina-
tion of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential
to the welfare of the public. . . -"43 This is the overriding significance
of Red Lion-its emphasis on the necessity that the broadcasting in-
dustry in the United States provide a free and fair forum for opposing
views on all public issues, regardless of how distasteful they may
be to the broadcasters or to the majority of American citizens.
In a time when the influence of the electronic communications
media has become such a pervasive force in modern American society,
when it is not uncommon for a quarter or more of this country's
population or of the population of any geographic area to see and/or
hear one opinion or one view on a public issue at the same instant,
we can hardly require less than what has been prescribed by the
FCC through the Fairness Doctrine. As the FCC observed in the
Editorializing Report, it is the right of the public to be informed
which is the fundamental concern-not the right of the government, or
a broadcaster, or an individual to put on the air his own particular
views. This right of the public to be informed is ... the foundation
stone of the American system of broadcasting."44
The question immediately raised is: What about the other com-
munications media, i.e the press? This is where the Red Lion
decision is disappointing-in its reliance on the 'limited access" and
"uniqueness" arguments45 which are used to justify the application
of different first amendment standards to broadcasters. By basing its
decision so much on this ground, the Court neglected an opportunity
42 ". . [T]he specific application of the fairness doctrine in Red Lion .
enhancees] rather than abridgers] the freedoms of speech and press protected by
the First Amendment." 395 U.S. at 375.
43 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).44 Editorializing Report, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1256 (1949).
45 See note 35 supra.
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for an essential reassessment of the first amendment in relation to
all communication media-both printed and electronic-an inter-
pretation based not on technical features and uniqueness concepts
of media, but on the consideration that all media are, in a sense,
trustees. They are trustees of the realm of public debate, and an
affirmative obligation to provide and encourage free expression of
opposing views on all issues of public importance should extend to
all communications media-not only to radio and television.46 Noted
constitutional scholars have commented on this view of the first
amendment:
The true meaning of freedom of speech seems to be this. One of
the most important purposes of society and government is the
discovery and spread of truth on subjects of general concern.47
Professor Barron, one of the leading exponents of the idea of freedom
of access to the press has stated:
The late Professor Meiklejohn, who has articulated a view of the
first amendment which assumes its justification to be political
self-government, has widely pointed out that 'what is essential
is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying
shall be said-that the point of ultimate interest is not the words
of the speakers but the minds of the hearers.48
While the Court would have had to go far beyond the issue it
was asked to decide in this case in order to make any such reinter-
pretation of the first amendment, it would appear that the Court
could have done more justice to the public's relation to the com-
munication media if it had more firmly founded its opinion on the
similarities rather than the differences in the media-or at least not
so pointedly emphasized those differences. The question is not
whether differences exist, but whether these differences justify varied
views of the first amendment.
The Red Lion decision is important because of its strong support
of the FCC's Fairness Doctrine. It would have been a more important
decision if it had decisively opened the door for a reassessment of
the function of the first amendment in relation to the communica-
tion media in contemporary society. As Professor Barron has ob-
served:
46or an extended discussion of this topic see Comment, The Red Lion Case:
An Opportunity for First Amendment Reappraisal, 29 U. Prrr. L. REv. 691 (1968).
4 Z. 4E , FpXE SPECH iN T UNIT STATEs 31 (1941).48 Barron, Access to the Press-A New First A ndent Right, 80 HAnv. L.
REv. 1641, 1653 (1967).
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The changing nature of the communications process has made it
imperative that the law show concern for the public interest in
effective utilization of media for the expression of diverse points
of view. Confrontation of ideas, a topic of eloquent affection in
contemporary decisions, demands some recognition of a right to
be heard as a constitutional principle.
49
C. Grey Pash, Jr.
CrvnL PiRocEDuRE - FEDERAL RuL,23 2- AGGREGATION OF CLAIMS. -
Plaintiff brought a class action in Missouri federal court alleging
jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship.' Since plaintiff's indi-
vidual claim was less than $10,000, defendant moved dismissal for
failure to show jurisdiction, contending that aggregation of individual
claims to reach the jurisdictional amount was improper in actions
under Rule 23.2 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court in holding aggregation improper.3 Soon thereafter, the
Tenth Circuit reached the opposite result under similar circumstances
and allowed aggregation of claims to invoke diversity jurisdiction.4
Because of the conflict between the position of the Fifth5 and Eighth
Circuits on one hand and the Tenth Circuit on the other, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 6 Held: Aggregation was improper. Under
Federal Rule 23, separate and distinct claims may not be added to-
gether to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
49 Id. at 1678.
1 The substance of her complaint was that certain directors of the Missouri
Fidelity Union Trust Life Insurance Company had sold their respective shares
at inflated prices, that the money exceeding the fair market value represented pay-
ment to those men to obtain control of the company, and that the excess should
be distributed among the stockholders.
228 U.S.C. § 1832 (1964) requires, inter alia, a showing that . . . the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest
and costs ... " The plaintiff contended that she and 4,000 other stockholders were
entitled to aggregate their individual claims to reach an amount in controversy
of about $1,200,000.
3 Snyder v. Harris, 309 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 393 U.S.
911 (1968). This decision was congruous with a similar ruling by the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Alvarez v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 992
(5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 827 (1967).
4 Gas Serv. Co. v. Coburn, 389 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. granted,
393 U.S. 911 (1968). This case is the companion to the one which is the sub-
ject of this comment. In a class action, the plaintiff alleged illegal collection of a
city franchise tax from him and 18,000 other customers living outside the city
limits. Although the alleged total overcharge was unknown, the court permitted
Coburn to aggregate his $7.81 claim with those of the other class members, which
aggregate was alleged to total more than $10,000.
5 See note 3 supra.0 Snyder was aTrnmed; Coburn was reversed. See note 4 supra.
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